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Abstract. We present a formal model of aspects of the haemodialysis
machine case study using the Circus specification notation. We focus on
building a model in which each of the software requirements (R-1–36)
are represented by a Circus action. All of these act in concert with actions
that model the collection of sensor data and the progress through the
various therapy phases and activities. We then present how we model
check the system using FDR. 1
1 Introduction
This paper describes our experience in modelling the haemodialysis machine
case study, that was issued for the ABZ 2016 conference[7]. We chose to do our
modelling using Circus, a fusion of Z and CSP. We saw the case study as a way
to assess how the ability to mix Z schemas with CSP-like processes would enable
us to structure the model in a reasonably modular manner.
Our primary focus was on the software requirements (R-1 through R-36)
and our plan was to use a Circus process or action to model the behaviour
implied by each of them. We also modelled some support services, such as clocks
and sensor reading actions, as well as the control-flow prescribed for the various
phases of a typical therapy session.
We make reference to the case-study document [7] using the shorthand
[HMCS] or [HMCS, part X]. We present a quick overview of Circus in §2. We
then give an overview of the approach and present some of the modelling in-
frastructure in §3, before describing how some of the software requirements were
modelled as processes in §4, where we also discuss how they were then assembled
to give the full model. An issue with Circus is the availability of tool support, and
so we discuss in §5 how we translated our model by hand into machine-readable
CSP (CSPm), so that we could use the FDR3 refinement-checker[3]. We talk
about issues and inconsistencies spotting during the modelling process in §6,
and then, in §7, we conclude.
1 This work was funded by CNPq (Brazilian National Council for Scientific and
Technological Development) within the Science without Borders programme, Grant
No. 201857/2014-6, and partially funded by Science Foundation Ireland grant
13/RC/2094. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/978-3-319-33600-8_34.
2 Quick Circus Guide
Woodcock and Cavalcanti developed Circus[12,10], as a formalism which not only
combines Z[13] and CSP[6], but also Dijkstra’s guarded command language [2].
Its semantics is based on the Unifying Theories of Programming (UTP)[5] and it
has a refinement calculus, developed by Oliveira[9] based on that of Morgan[8].
The thesis by Oliveria[9] is also the de-facto reference for Circus2 .
A Circus script can be considered as a series of “paragraphs”, which can be
either Z paragraphs or CSP process definitions, or a hybrid mix of CSP with
“commands” to produce actions. The key feature here is that Circus uses Z-
schemas to declare variables and state invariants, and then allows CSP actions
to refer to and modify those variables.
We shall present a simplified version of Circus here, focussing on those CSP
aspects as used in this paper. We shall simply model state-changing operations
by variable assignment, as proxy for the Z schema parts. In the rest of the paper
we make use of proper Z schemas.
For both CSP and Circus, a typical description consists of a series of defini-
tions of the form
N (v1, v2, . . . , vn) =̂ C
where N is a (process/action) name, the vi are local parameters, and C is a
process/action “construct” that may or may not refer to N and the vi .
Basic building blocks include expressions over local state, and ways to de-
scribe events:
N ∈ Name — Process Names
k ∈ Const — Concrete Values
v ∈ Var — Local Variables
e ∈ Expr — Expressions over Local State
a ∈ Event — Atomic Events
c ∈ Chan — Event Channel
c.k ∈ Event — Channel Data Event
Events are observable, atomic (they either happen “in full” or not at all) but can
be composite objects. So a common idiom is to describe events — atomic ! —
of the form c.k which is to be interpreted as the atomic event consisting of the
transfer of a value k along a channel c. A process is an entity that is willing to
perform some events, but not others, depending on its current state. We consider
all processes as interacting with an environment, also considered as a process.
A process willing to perform an event can be said to be “offering” that event.
Whether or not the event actually occurs depends on both the willingness of the
environment to perform it, and the synchronisation requirements between the
process and its environment.
2 More details and publications about Circus can be found at https://www.cs.york.
ac.uk/circus/
We shall first consider those constructs of Circus that are essentially the same
as their CSP counterparts:
C ::= Skip — Termination
| a −→ C — Prefix
| c?v −→ C — Input
| c!e −→ C — Output
| C ; C — Sequential Composition
| C J cs K C — Parallel Composition (CSP)
| C 9 C — Parallel Interleaving
| C @ C — External Choice
| e & C — Guarded Process
| N (e1, e2, . . . , en) — Process Call
| µX • C — Recursion
Briefly, Skip terminates immediately; Prefix a −→C performs event a and then
behaves like C ; Input c?v −→C performs a channel event c.k where k is a valid
value for local variable v , and then behaves like C [k/v ]; and Output c!e −→ C
performs event c.k , where k is the current valuation of e, and then behaves like
C . We also have sequential composition where C1 ; C2 behaves first like C1 and
then behaves like C2. Another composition form is parallel, in which C1 J cs KC2
runs both commands in parallel, synchronising on events in cs and interleaving
others. External choice (C1 @C2) allows the environment to choose between the
events offered by C1 and C2, so determining which runs. The guarded command
e & C behaves like C if e evaluates to true, otherwise behaves like the
canonical deadlocked process Stop, which is a unit for external choice.
Now we look at those constructs which have been added to CSP to produce
Circus, as well as CSP constructs that require modification in order to “play
nice” with the extended semantics.
C :: + v := e — Assignment
| if G 8 . . . 8G fi — Guarded Choice
| C ||[ us | cs | vs ]|| C — Parallel Composition (Circus)
G ::= e −→ C — Guarded Command
We have assignment v := e , that updates a variable that can be local or global.
We also have guarded commands (if . . .fi) in the “Dijkstra Style”[2], where a
single guarded command is denoted by e−→C , e being a boolean-valued expres-
sion. The strong similarity between event prefix (a−→C ) and guarded command
(e−→C ) is unfortunate, but is part of the official Circus syntax[9]. However, it
has the same semantics as guarded processes, so, for clarity’s sake, we shall use
e & C in the sequel for both, to avoid confusion with prefixing.
For Circus we need a slightly more complicated notion of parallel composition
because we have global state. In order to put C1 and C2 (say) in parallel, we
require that the sets of variables modified by the two commands be disjoint,
otherwise the parallel composition is not well-formed. We write C1 ||[ us | cs |
vs ]|| C2 to indicate that the variables modified by C1 are contained in us, and
those modified by C2 are in vs, with us ∩ vs = ∅. As with CSP parallel, we
also specify the events/channels (cs) on which both sides must synchronise. In
addition, when the parallel composition starts, each side gets its own snapshot
of the starting variable state, which it then subsequently uses to record its own
variable updates. While either of C1 or C2 are still running, the state changes
made by one are not visible to the other. At the end, once both have terminated,
then their snapshots are merged to give the overall final state. This means that
if C1 wants to communicate a state change to C2, while both are still running,
then it must use input/output events to achieve this.
One key advantage that Circus has over CSP is its ease of handling a large
collection of named state components, when most situations only require the
update of a few of those components. For example, imaging a process FIRST
that waits for an event e and then increments a state component called s, which
is one among a large number of such components, and then behaves like NEXT .
The CSP definition of FIRST and NEXT would be something like the following:
FIRST (. . . , c, . . . ) =̂ e −→NEXT (. . . , c + 1, . . . )
NEXT (. . . ) =̂ . . .
The Circus equivalent would be
FIRST =̂ e −→ c := c + 1 ; NEXT
NEXT =̂ . . .
3 Approach
In order to formalise the HD machine[4], a few decisions were made regarding
the system environment, sensors and the kind of responses that are required. In
this section, we present our decisions about how we deal with timing, the overall
structure of the HD machine, as well as how we capture the sensing functionality,
and how the system should respond to events according to the requirements.
3.1 Timing Properties
A first consideration we need to take into account is how we handle time, as
there are several safety requirements for the machine that deal with time. For
example, the software requirement R-2 deals with the absence of blood flow in
the machine for a period of 120 seconds. After that period is over, the machine
should respond right away by stopping the blood flow and raising an alarm.
We did not feel that the timing issues in the specification warranted the
complexities of using a timed variant of Circus. Also, the precise times are not
that important for our model —rather than waiting for a model time to elapse
corresponding to 120 seconds, we would simply treat It more symbolically. All
we really need to be able to distinguish is between a time when haven’t reached
such a limit, and that limit time.
We defined a Circus process called SysClock that starts with the ResetClock
process that initialises the time variable and then calls Clock . On its turn, Clock
repeatedly issues tick events, and increments a state component called time,
storing the current time. The current SysClock time is made available through
the channel getCurrentTime.
Clock =̂ µX •
(
tick −→ time := time + 19getCurrentTime!time −→ Skip
)
; X
ResetClock =̂ time := 0 ; Clock
Another feature we need to have in our model is a wait period in order to
comply with requirements such as R-16 that specifies a period of time between
two phases of the therapy. We therefore define a Circus process Wait that counts
n tick cycles. The variable n is decremented after each tick and the entire process
ends when the value of n reaches zero, here defined as a Skip action.
Wait =̂ var n : Z •(
if n > 0−→ (tick −→Wait(n − 1)) 8 n = 0−→ Skip fi )
3.2 State Components
The notion of machine state is essential in order to record key values of the
various components of the system. Reading the software requirements section
led us to identify over 20 state components used during the execution of the
system. These are related to sensor measurements, sensor limits and switches
that allows the physician to adjust the parameters for the therapy.
We also take into account some components that we decided to include in
our specification as state components. These are used, for example, to register
the activity and therapy phases of the HD machine. We also create records of
the time in the system.
In our model, we define the Z schema HDGenComp, composed of the state
components that we identified whilst reading the system requirements. For in-
stance, we identify the airVol and airVolLimit parameters from R-28–32, as
detailed in Section 4.
HDGenComp
airVolLimit : Z; airVol : Z; alarm : SWITCH ; . . .
describing with the description of many components of the system. For instance,
[HMCS, Table 2] describes the rinsing parameters that are defined and entered
into the machine during therapy. These parameters have specific ranges of val-
ues. We model the content of Table 2 as the RinsingParameters schema with
its components. Moreover, we define the value ranges of the components as
state invariants. For example, the range for the Filling BP rate is 0 − 6000mL
and is modelled in Z as the state variable fillingBPRate, with an invariant of
fillingBPRate ∈ { x : Z • 0 ≤ x ≤ 6000}. The overall state component
RinsingParameters is illustrated below.
RinsingParameters
fillingBPRate : Z; rinsingBPRate : Z; . . .
fillingBPRate ∈ { x : Z | 0 ≤ x ≤ 6000}
rinsingBPRate ∈ { x : Z | 50 ≤ x ≤ 300}
. . .
The entire state of the HD machine is modelled as the schema HDState, which is
composed by the above described HDGenComp schema, along with the
RinsingParameters and all the other schemas, DFParameters, such as
UFParameters, PressureParameters, and HeparinParameters, modelling the vari-
ables detailed in the [HMCS, Tables 3–6].
HDState =̂ HDGenComp ∧ RinsingParameters ∧ DFParameters
∧ UFParameters ∧ PressureParameters ∧ HeparinParameters
We also initialise the HDGenComp components modelled as the
HDGenCompInit schema that basically sets the numerical values to zero, along
with switching off the alarm and closing sensors and tubes.
HDGenCompInit =̂ [∆HDState | airVolLimit ′ = 0 ∧ airVol ′ = 0 ∧ . . .]
As part of our HD machine model, we want to detect the values from the various
sensors in the system and update these into the state components described
above. In order to achieve that task, we define the Circus process SensorReadings
that watches a number of Circus channels each of them responsible for sensing a
specific value arising from the machine sensors. These values are then stored in
the state components, as described by HDGenComp.
SensorReadings =̂
senApTransdPress?apTransdPress −→ SensorReadings@ senInfVol?infVol −→ SensorReadings@ . . .
In addition, this process also makes the current recorded readings available
SensorReadings =̂
. . .@ repApTransdPress!apTransdPress −→ SensorReadings@ repInfVol !infVol −→ SensorReadings@ . . .
The process SensorReadings is basically a large external choice over all sensor
readings and reading reports, that repeats endlessly.
This approach is fine for sensor readings for which the time at which they
occur is not important and so we are happy for an interested process to poll
the relevant state component at regular intervals. Some sensor readings require
some form of timestamping with possible timeouts, and some of these are handled
separately, as explained later.
In order to capture the transition between the therapy phases of the HD
machine, we provide a Circus process called StatePhase, that changes the value
of the state variable hdMachineState depending on signals received during the
therapy. Basically, when the process for a specific therapy phase begins, it imme-
diately uses a special event to announce its commencement. Process StatePhase
monitors these and updates state variables accordingly. For example after a sig-
nal preparationPhase, produced by the Circus process TherapyPreparation, the
state variable hdMachineState is changed to prepPhase and will be used by the
software requirements as described in the Section 4.
StatePhase =̂
µX •

preparationPhase −→ hdMachineState := prepPhase@connectingToPatient−→
hdMachineState := connectThePatient@therapyInitiation −→ hdMachineState := initPhase@therapyEnding −→ hdMachineState := endPhase
 ; X
3.3 Response to the requirements
Whilst modelling the software requirements, we were able to identify twelve
different kinds of behaviours that are expected among the 36 listed requirements.
For each of them, we needed to provide an action that is equivalent to the
intended behaviour of the requirement. For example, the expected behaviour for
the requirement R-1 to be satisfied is to stop the blood flow and raise an alarm.
We formalise those two responses as Z schemas StopBloodFlow and RaiseAlarm:
the former produces a signal stopBloodFlow stopping the current flow and the
latter sets the alarm to ENABLED and then triggers the buzzer of the system.
StopBloodFlow =̂ stopBloodFlow −→ Skip
RaiseAlarm =̂ [∆HDState | alarm ′ = ENABLED ];
produceAlarmSound −→ Skip
This two process capture a common behaviour when a requirement error condi-
tion arises.
4 Model Development
In this section we give details of the modelling that resulted from our chosen
approach: namely to model each of the safety requirements R-1 to R-36 as
a Circus Action that “enforces” that requirement. It allows us to show how
the sensors are integrated into our model and how the system should behave
accordingly. We then present an overview of the therapy phases of the machine,
describing how we structure our model with respect to the activities performed.
4.1 Software Requirements
A first example of how we model the requirement is illustrated by the requirement
R-1. According to the description, during the application of arterial bolus, the
system monitors the volume of saline infusion and if the volume exceeds 400ml,
the system should stop the blood flow and raise an alarm signal.
PreR1
∆HDState
hdActivity ∈ {applicationArterialBolus} ∧ infSalineVol > 400
We define a schema PreR1 for the alarm-state precondition, and if it is satis-
fied, the system will perform StopBloodFlow and RaiseAlarm. If the precondi-
tion is not satisfied (¬ PreR1), it waits for a defined period of time (parameter
CheckInterval) and checks again. This illustrates the general approach here for
many of these monitoring requirements. They check state variables at regular
intervals and raise alarms if required. This decouples them from the process of
doing sensor readings and recording the results.
R1 =̂ (PreR1 ; (StopBloodFlow 9 RaiseAlarm))
∨ ¬ PreR1 ; Wait(CheckInterval) ; R1
The second software requirement, R-2, monitors the blood flow and in the event
that no flow is detected for a period longer than 120 seconds, the system should
raise an alarm and stop. We formalise the requirement with help of two inter-
leaved processes, NoFlowWatchDog and BloodFlowSample.
R2 =̂ NoFlowWatchDog 9 BloodFlowSample
The former process monitors the time interval during which no blood flow occurs.
if this exceeds the timeout, then the system will stop the blood pump StopBP
and RaiseAlarm.
NoFlowWatchDog =̂ getCurrentTime?time−→
time − lastNonZeroBF > 120000 & tick −→ StopBP ; RaiseAlarm@ time − lastNonZeroBF ≤ 120000 & tick −→NoFlowWatchDog
The second helper process is BloodFlowSample, which monitors the blood flow
arising from the channel senBloodFlowInEBC . Whenever the value of
bloodFlowInEBC is different, the state component lastNonZeroBF is updated
with the current time in the system.
BloodFlowSample =̂ getCurrentTime?time−→
senBloodFlowInEBC ?bloodFlowInEBC−→( if bloodFlowInEBC 6= 0 & lastNonZeroBF := time8bloodFlowInEBC = 0 & Skip fi
)
;
BloodFlowSample

This is an example of a sensor reading that is not handled by SensorReadings,
because it needs to record a timestamp for the most recent non-zero reading.
Requirement R-9 is an example of how we create helper processes in order
to capture the intended behaviour of the system. During the phase connecting
the patient, the machine should monitor the pressure at the VP transducer and
if the value measured exceeds 450mmHg for more than 3 seconds, the machine
should respond by stopping the blood pump and raising an alarm signal.
In our model, we first create a helper process TrackTimervpTransdPressR9
that monitors such pressure values through the channel senvpTransdPress, af-
ter one tick event and updates the timer interval with the following condition:
when the sensed VP transducer pressure is higher than 450, the timer interval is
incremented; otherwise, the timer is reset until the condition is satisfied again.
TrackTimervpTransdPressR9 =̂
 tick −→ senvpTransdPress?x−→( if x > 450 & timerIntervalR9 := timerIntervalR9 + 18x ≤ 450 & timerIntervalR9 := 0 fi
) ;
TrackTimervpTransdPressR9

The next step is to define a Z schema PreR9, in which we define the alarm pre-
condition for the requirement itself. The requirement is specified for use during
the initiation phase and is satisfied if the value of vpTransdPress is higher than
450 for a period of 3 seconds, captured by the timerIntervalR9 state variable
with a value higher than 3000 ms.
PreR9
∆HDState
hdMachineState ∈ {connectThePatient}
vpTransdPress > 450 ∧ timerIntervalR9 > 3000
Should the precondition of the R-9 requirement be satisfied, the system does
StopBP and RaiseAlarm. Otherwise, it waits for a predefined time interval before
checking again.
R9 =̂
(
µX •
(
(PreR9 ; (StopBP 9 RaiseAlarm))
∨ ¬ PreR9 ; Wait(CheckInterval) ; X
))
9TrackTimervpTransdPressR9
During the connecting the patient phase, R-16 specifies a time interval of 310 sec-
onds for that phase. When the specified time ends, the machine should change to
the initiation phase. We formalise that requirement through a signal conToPatient ,
followed by a wait period of 310000 ticks, and ended with a signal therapyInit
that is triggered at the beginning of that phase.
R16 =̂ conToPatient −→ Wait(310000) ; therapyInit −→ Skip
4.2 Therapy Processes
We now describe how we model the therapy phases of the HD machine—the top
level “workflow”, so to speak. According to the requirements, the system starts
with the preparation phase, followed by the initiation phase, and an ending
phase:
MainTherapy =̂ TherapyPreparation ; TherapyInitiation ; TherapyEnding
The initiation phase also contains the “perform therapy” phase for some reason
that is unclear to us3 . Each of these phases is further broken down.
For the therapy preparation phase, we define a Circus process that starts
with a signal preparationPhase, followed by a sequence of activities according
to [HMCS,§3.2]. A key idea here is each phase signals that it has started, on
a channel, so that requirements and activities that are phase-dependent can
ascertain when they should be active.
We capture the steps that compose the therapy preparation phase, each one,
with a Circus process that behaves accordingly.
TherapyPreparation =̂
preparationPhase −→AutomatedSelfTest;
ConnectingTheConcentrate ; SetRinsingParameters;
InsertingRinsingTestingTubSystem ; PrepHeparinPump;
SetTreatParameters ; RinsingDialyzer
A similar pattern is used for the other phases.
As an example of a phase activity, we show the specification SetRinsingParameters,
which collects parameter settings from the clinician, here modelled as a Z schema
with inputs:
SetRinsingParameters
setFBPRate? : Z; setRBPRate? : Z
setRTime? : Z; setUFRFRinsing? : Z
setUFVFRinsing? : Z; setBFFCPatient? : Z
∆HDState
fillingBPRate ′ = setFBPRate? ∧ rinsingBPRate ′ = setRBPRate?
rinsingTime ′ = setRTime? ∧ ufVolForRinsing ′ = setUFVFRinsing?
ufRateForRinsing ′ = setUFRFRinsing?
bloodFlowForConnectingPatient ′ = setBFFCPatient?
3 Particularly, because it should be the phase that lasts longest!
4.3 Putting it all together
We conclude this section by detailing how we put all the pieces together. We
start the main process of the HD machine, the HDMachine process, with the
schema HDGenCompInit that initialises the state variables of the system. Then,
the system is modelled as a parallelism between the MainTherapy process and
the SoftwareRequirements process.
A second parallelism is required between the above and the StatePhase Circus
process. The latter is a process that watches the changes of state, through signals
like preparationPhase and therapyInitiation, and after these, the state variable
hdMachineState are set accordingly, in order to be used by the requirements
defined for the SoftwareRequirements process. Then the components are put in
parallel with the SensorReadings process, used for example, to update the values
of the state components.
HDMachine =̂ HDGenCompInit;
(MainTherapyJHDGenCompStChanSet K SoftwareRequirements
)
JTherapyPhaseChanSet K StatePhase

JSensorReadingsComm K SensorReadings

Finally, the entire system is put in parallel with the SysClock process, synchro-
nising on the channels tick and getCurrentTime, denoting the time elapsed, and
the output of the time value for the rest of the therapy, respectively.
HDMachine J {| tock , getCurrentTime |} K SysClock
5 Checking the Model
Currently, there is limited tool support for Circus, and nothing that can be
used for direct model-checking of machine-readable Circus. Limited support can
found as part of the Community Z Tools (CZT) project[1], as extensions to the
Z support there. This is facilitated by the way that the machine-readable syntax
of Circus takes the form of LATEX documents in that same way as that of Z.
We were able to use the Circus extension to CZT, which include a parser
and type-checker to assess our model. After minor revisions correcting typos
and small type errors, we obtained a model that satisfied both the parser and
type-checker.
The current approach to model-checking Circus is to translate it into machine-
readable CSP (CSPM ), and use FDR3[3] to do the model checking. Unfortu-
nately, there is no automated way to do this, so such translations have to be
done by hand. Fully-, or even semi-, automatic translation from Circus to CPSm
is difficult, but is an active research topic. FDR3 itself is described as a refine-
ment checker, which basically means is that it is a model checker, where the
models are labelled transition systems derived from the operational semantics
of CSP, and the properties to be checked are assertions about the existence of
a refinement relation between two distinct models, one for the specification, the
other for the implementation.
Manual Translation We manually translated our Circus specification into
CSPM , in order to do some basic checks, particularly regarding deadlock free-
dom. Here we give a brief description of the translation and the challenges we
encountered, most notably that of avoiding state-space explosion.
For most of the Circus constructs, we have a pretty straightforward transla-
tion into CSPM , as we know that Circus is derived from CSP. For example, a
lot of the type and channel declarations are very simple, so the following Circus
fragment:
STATEPHASE ::= connectThePatient | initPhase | prepPhase | endPhase
channel preparationPhase, therapyInitiation
would become the following CSPM fragment:
datatype STATEPHASE
= connectThePatient | initPhase | prepPhase | endPhase
channel preparationPhase, therapyInitiation
We then translate Z schemas into CSPM as tuples. Each component of a Z
schema is translated as a nametype represented by a tuple. For example, the
following state schema fragment
RinsingParameters
fillingBPRate : Z; rinsingBPRate : Z
fillingBPRate ∈ {0 . . 6000} ∧ rinsingBPRate ∈ {50 . . 300}
is translated into a tuple where, for example, the first component of the tuple
is the range of values for the fillingBPRate, of type N, restricted to the values 0
up to 6000.
nametype RinsingParameters = ({0..6000},{50..300})
5.1 Translation of Circus processes containing state
In Circus, when we want to manipulate the values of a component of a state
component, we can freely access it, even as an assignment, as it is within the
context of the Circus process. However that is not possible in CSPM .
We need to adopt a different approach for the translation. Basically we con-
cert each state schema into a CSP process that has get and set events for each
state component, so that, for example, the Circus action
x := y + 1
would become something like
getY?myY -> setX!(myY+1) -> Skip
All the actions accessing global state would run in parallel synchronising on the
relevant get and set events.
5.2 Checking of the model using FDR
We checked our CSPM model of the HD Machine using FDR3, with assertions
regarding deadlock and livelock freedom. These helped us re-factor our model,
mainly to avoid deadlocks that occurred because of errors in specifying synchro-
nisation events. As a result of this we are very confident that our Circus model
is deadlock-free.
A big issue we had to deal with was the fact that our original Circus model
had a huge state-space: we had a clock that ticked every millisecond, together
with a timeout in one of the requirements of 310 seconds. We also had checks for
values in large numeric ranges, typically for fluid volumes. We had to carefully
decide how to shrink the state-space by reducing the range of values as low as
possible without having an impact on the integrity of the model.
Fortunately, most of the uses for numbers are to specify limits outside of
which special action needs to be taken. Also, in many cases the number values
are specific to just one requirement or a small coherent group. This makes is
easy to shrink the range of values for one such requirement without worrying
about its effect on another.
For example, R-20–21 talks about measures that span the range of normal
human body temperature, but are only explicit about two boundaries, one at
33◦C , the other at 41◦C . Error conditions arise if the temperature outside those
bounds. This defines three regions of interest, but we do not need to model
temperature values in the range 32 . . . 42 (say), but simply have three values
that denote: “too cold”, “too hot” and “just right”.
We were able to check small clusters of requirement processes against the full
machine model, and show their interaction was deadlock free. Even running the
tests on a virtual machine cluster with 16 cores and 32GB of RAM we found
that we handle at most about 3 requirements at a time. However as they are all
independent, it didn’t prevent us form checking them all.
Further ways to attempt overcome the state-space problem are described
by Roscoe et al. [11], suggesting the use of compression techniques in order to
model-check larger CSP specifications in FDR, allowing the reduction of both
the number of states and the transitions to be visited. We will explore this as
part of future work.
5.3 Back-annotation
Where analysis with FDR3 exposed any structural issues, we modified the Circus
version, as would be expected. However we have not, at this stage, made the
changes to number ranges needed to make model-checking feasible. Simply put,
since there are no model-checkers for Circus, or automated translation to any
other modelling notation such as CSPM , we felt that we would keep the “full
story” in the model. Clearly this would need to be addressed should automatic
checking become possible.
6 Observations
One of the often-touted advantages of building formal models is that the rigour,
level of detail and completeness that they require, results in the exposure of a lot
of ambiguities and incompletenesses in the informal requirements and specifica-
tions. Here we collect a number of such issues that arose as part of our rigorous,
detailed analysis of the case study.
We did look at the safety requirements and future work will look at formal-
ising those with a view of being able to check the requirements model against
the safety one. We shall start with a few observations regarding safety:
– S-4 talks about draining saline solution to a bag/bucket attached to the
venous connector. Presumably this means the patient isn’t connected here.
But this is when the patient is connected to EBC, and S-1 requires both
arterial and venous connectors are connected simultaneously.
– S-5 makes a very ambiguous use of the phrase “can be connected”. This
can refer to a state, of being connected (up) to something or to a pro-
cess, that involves making the connection with something (which will of
course result in being in the state of being connected). We believe that what
S-5 intended to state was that the process (connecting to) could only occur
during initiation, but that the state (now connected to) would continue to
hold during the main therapy portion.
– S-7 talks about power-loss. We are given no information about how the
machine might cope, or the hardware’s power-down state. How might an
alarm be raised without power? Also, surely S-7 should be about blood flow
stopping for any reason, not just power failure?
– S-9 talks about the difference between actual and measured blood flow,
mentioning low or negative AP as an issue. Is there a well-defined relationship
linking actual flow to measured flow and AP?
Next, issues that arose while looking at requirements and activities:
– State Components: We identified a bunch of parameters and sensors
that are described in the software requirements section. Some of these are
not mentioned elsewhere in the entire text and therefore we do not know
what the restrictions are regarding expected values for them. We modelled
these items based on our limited understanding, defining types for each of
them. These are modelled as components of the HDGenComp schema, as
part of the HDState. For instance, the pressure at the VP transducer and AP
transducer are modelled as vpTransdPress and apTransdPress respectively.
– Alarm: In several requirements, the expected behaviour of the system is
to raise an alarm. However, we don’t know precisely what is the overall
behaviour of the system for most of these requirements. Once the alarm is
raised, what is the expected behaviour of the system? Does the system stop
entirely until the alarm is acknowledged, or are some functions not available?
– R-35 is not formalised in our current version of the HD machine model.
There seems to be a safety issue in this requirement. The system “shall
monitor the net fluid removal volume and if the net fluid removal volume
exceeds (UF set volume + 200 mL)”, the machine goes into bypass and the
alarm is raised. However, once the alarm is acknowledged by the user, the
requirement says that “the software shall increase the UF set volume by 200
mL”. Is it really the intention to set a limit monitored by an alarm where
the response mandate for the user is to raise the limit to the level were the
alarm signal is (just) disabled?
7 Conclusions
We started this Circus case-study as a response to the HD machine case study,
proposed for the ABZ 2016 conference[7]. We summarise our approach thus: we
capture the communication between the sensors and the system and also define
a structure for the data used around the system; we make use of Z schemas in
order to define the model state and also operations that change that state, all
related to the various sensor readings and parameters defined for the therapy.
We have around a thousand lines of Circus specification for the model, with
about sixty state variables and forty events, and we have around ninety pro-
cesses/actions used for modelling the requirements and the overall therapy pro-
cedures. We found that the ability to read and write small state components by
name (using small Z schemas and assignment) coupled with the usual ability
to structure CSP as small parallel processes made it easy to restrict any formal
text to only parts of the system that were immediately relevant.
In our investigation, we were able to model almost all the software require-
ments with exception of R-35 whose description leads us to see a contradiction
that may be a safety issue, as discussed in Section 6.
Due to the current lack of tool support for direct checking of Circus specifica-
tions, we needed to translate our model, by hand, into CSP in order to be able
to perform model checking using FDR3[3]. In our translation, we had to adapt
the Circus model for CSPM because Circus programs has explicit state-based
features (such as assignment), which are not present in CSPM , which instead
relies on process parameter-lists to handle state. The equivalent specification
written in CSPMhas around 24 hundred lines, more than twice the size of the
Circus version, due to the inclusion of auxiliary functions and new channels for
communicating with the new state-modelling processes. We were able to perform
model checking using FD3R and perform checks that the requirements could run
in parallel with the therapy model, synchronising on common events, without
any deadlocks.
For future work, we intend to build the corresponding model of the safety
requirements, and link it to the requirements model in order to look for in-
consistencies. Other possible avenues of investigation would include deriving a
formal software specification structured around the architecture and functional
decomposition of a realistic implementation design. We would expect this to
be structured differently to the model we have just derived from the require-
ments, and it would raise interesting issues regarding their refinement relation
and verification.
Another interesting piece of future work would be to derive software proto-
types from our Circus model to allow us to simulate the system execution. In
the long term, we have interest in working with theorem proving for the refine-
ment of Circus programs and possible proofs of test-cases. It is also in our plans
to explore the development of tools that allows us to perform model-checking
directly with Circus programs.
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